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Abstract— Deploying defense mechanisms in routers holds
promises for protecting infrastructure resources such as link
bandwidth or router buffers against network Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks. However, in spite of their efficacy against bruteforce flooding attacks, existing router-based defenses often perform poorly when confronted to more sophisticated attack strategies. This paper presents the design and evaluation of a system
aimed at identifying and containing a broad range of malicious
traffic patterns. Its main feature is a double time horizon
architecture, designed for effective regulation of attacking traffic
at both short and long time scales. The short horizon component
responds quickly to transient traffic surges that deviate significantly from regular (TCP) traffic, i.e., attackers that generate
sporadic short bursts. Conversely, the long horizon mechanism
enforces strict conformance with normal TCP behavior, but does
so by considering traffic over longer time periods, and is therefore
aimed at attackers that attempt to capture a significant amount
of link bandwidth. The performance of the proposed system was
tested extensively. Our findings suggest that the implementation
cost of the system is reasonable, and that it is indeed efficient
against various types of attacks while remaining transparent to
normal TCP users.

I. I NTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Network Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, or bandwidth
attacks, that directly target network infrastructure resources
such as link bandwidth and/or router buffer are an important
threat to the reliability of the Internet. Network DoS attacks
are usually perpetrated by compromising a large number of
“zombie” hosts and commandeering them to source flooding
traffic towards a target link or network. During an attack, the
amount of flooding traffic is often large enough to overwhelm
the target, and disrupt the performance of normal users.
To combat network DoS attacks, it is natural to deploy
mechanisms around critical network resources to serve as a
first “line of defense”. This approach is taken in router-based
defenses [19], [18], [13], [14], [27] that directly monitor the
usage of resources such as bandwidth or buffer. Router-based
defenses rely on certain pre-defined “normal” system behaviors, usually expressed in terms of incoming traffic patterns
and/or local router conditions, to identify DoS attack(ers).
Activities deviating from this “norm”, once detected, are
automatically classified as malicious and subjected to further
regulation. This facilitates on-line detection and mitigation of
This work was supported by NSF grant ITR00-85930.

DoS attacks, which makes such defenses more desirable than
more reactive solutions such as traceback [4], [22].
In spite of their efficacy against brute-force, high-rate attacks, one major concern with router-based DoS defenses is
their robustness under more sophisticated real-world attacks.
To shed some light on this issue, we explored in [23] the
extent to which several existing router-based defenses could be
defeated by attackers employing more complex traffic flooding
strategies. Based on the granularity at which abnormal behaviors are defined, router-based defenses can be categorized
into aggregate level defenses and flow level defenses. In [23],
we focused on two specific systems, the Aggregate Congestion Control (ACC) [18] proposal and the RED preferential
dropping (RED-PD) proposal [19], which are representative of
aggregate level defenses and flow level defenses, respectively.
The investigation revealed a number of vulnerabilities in both
designs. In particular, because aggregate level defenses rely on
coarse grain traffic descriptors, namely, “traffic aggregates,”
to detect attackers, they are often not effective at defending
against more subtle malicious behaviors posed by individual
users, or flows 1 . For example, the ACC system, which is
designed to regulate bandwidth hogs that induce significant
congestion, can be defeated by an attacker that carefully
controls its rate increase to avoid ever triggering severe losses.
In contrast, flow level defenses rely on fine-grain descriptors
that specify the expected traffic profile of a well-behaving user.
For example, the RED-PD system incorporates the notion of
“TCP-friendliness,” and regulates flows transmitting at a rate
(abnormally) higher than a standard TCP flow. Unfortunately,
though this is effective against high bandwidth attackers, it
remains vulnerable to low-rate attackers that periodically blast
short traffic bursts. The fact that bursty ON-OFF attackers can
defeat a base RED-PD system was first identified in [17], with
the “Shrew” attacker, and subsequently in [11]. Our study [23]
confirmed these results, but focused on understanding the
reasons behind these failures. Our findings suggest that the
failure of the RED-PD defense stems from its slow response,
as thwarting highly transient attackers calls for the rapid
identification of suspicious traffic and the swift imposition of
1 The traffic of an individual user is often represented by a “flow”, which
is a fine-grain traffic descriptor associated with a particular combination of
source/destination addresses, port numbers and protocol ID.

steep penalties.
The goal of this paper is to leverage the understanding
of [23] to build a router-based defense that remains effective
under a broad range of attacks. Based on [23], we select
flow level defenses that enforce standard TCP behavior as our
starting point and seek to strengthen them along two main dimensions. First, the defense system should be efficient against
a wide variety of attacks. Ideally, it should keep the impact of
an attacker to a level similar to that of a “normal” TCP flow,
independent of the flooding strategy. In addition, the defense
system should be transparent to legitimate TCP users, i.e.,
impose minimal penalties on them. In order to understand how
to build defenses that can fulfill these goals, we first evaluate
a set of schemes that represent likely choices for a successful
design. We find that performance is heavily dependent on the
time period (horizon) used to detect malicious behaviors, as
well as the mechanism employed to filter suspicious traffic. In
particular, a short horizon mechanism coupled with a stringent
regulation strategy, e.g., dropping all out-of-profile traffic, is
very effective at eliminating malicious traffic. However, as
flow rates commonly fluctuate over small time scales, such
a scheme often ends up wrongly penalizing legitimate users.
A long horizon mechanism that averages traffic over longer
time intervals fares better in that respect, but is ineffective at
throttling transient attackers, because it either fails to detect
them or reacts too slowly to their presence.
To overcome this dilemma, we propose a double horizon
defense architecture. The short horizon component relies on
a traffic profile looser than the standard TCP behavior, and
allows for quick reaction to transient and high intensity
attacks without sacrificing transparency. However, this does
not protect against steady and less aggressive attackers. This is
the responsibility of the long horizon component that enforces
strict TCP conformance, but over a longer time interval to
avoid falsely identifying regular TCP rate fluctuations as
malicious. We provide evidences in support of this design,
and demonstrate that it not only meets our design goals, but
also that it can be implemented using simple hash table data
structures, with a processing and storage cost affordable even
for very high link speeds.
The investigation carried out in this paper is a comprehensive exploration of the design space associated with building
robust router-based defenses that remain efficient across a
broad range of attacks. Specifically, the defense is able to
significantly curtail the impact of an attacker to no more
than that of a regular TCP user, no matter how it varies its
traffic. This being said, attackers can still be successful in
disrupting normal traffic if they manage to summon a large
enough number of hosts, e.g., as in the case of BotNets attacks
[15] or reflector attacks [21]. In such cases, it is virtually
impossible to distinguish an attacking host from a legal host,
solely on the basis of their individual traffic. Defending against
such attacks calls for different measures to identify attackers.
We discuss this further in Section VI, in which we argue
that combining the defense mechanism proposed in this paper
with certain aggregate mechanisms, e.g., the detection and
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regulation techniques used by the ACC defense, is a promising
approach for dealing with both such large-scale DDoS attacks
and the more pernicious attacks we focus on in this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we present the broad design space we consider for developing
defense mechanisms. Section III explores different design
choices within this space and motivates our choice of a
double horizon design. Section IV provides specific details on
the proposed design, analyzes its complexity, and discusses
configuration issues. In Section V, we demonstrate that the
design is effective against a wide variety of attacks in different
configurations. We discuss related studies in Section VI, and
conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. D ESIGN S PACE AND O PTIONS
In this section, we introduce a generic design framework for
flow level defenses. This framework allows us to capture the
major factors that affect defense performance, and to identify
specific schemes of interest.
Flow level defenses rely on an a priori definition of the
“normal” behavior of individual flows, which they constantly
strive to enforce. Since TCP users dominate the Internet user
community, it is reasonable to define “normal” user behavior
based on how a TCP flow consumes link resources, i.e., to
enforce TCP-friendliness. As shown in Fig. 1, a typical flow
level defense consists of two major components: a detection
component and a regulation component, which are connected
through a classifier. A flow violating the standard TCP profile,
once identified by the detector, will be classified as potentially
malicious and have its traffic filtered inside the regulation
component before entering the link queue. In this paper,
we assume the defense systems relies on a RED queue [8]
that implements random dropping. As we will discuss, this
facilitates estimating the rate of TCP flows. In the following,
we elaborate on the design choices for the detection and
regulation components, respectively.
A. Detection Strategy
The detection component measures the resource usage of
all active flows traversing the link and identifies flows that
do not conform to “normal” TCP behavior. Fulfilling this
task requires two different operations: tracking the baseline
behavior of a TCP flow and measuring the resource usage of
incoming flows.
1) Profiling TCP-friendly Behavior: A common approach
for characterizing normal TCP behavior is the “TCP-friendly”
concept [7], which categorizes as conformant any flow sending
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at a lower rate than a long-lived TCP flow under the same
conditions. The stable rate of a persistent TCP flow is wellknown to be roughly equal to:
√
1.5
f (r, p) = √
(1)
r p
where r and p are the round-trip time and the steady state loss
event rate experienced by that flow [7].
To identify non-conformant users, it is necessary to obtain
an accurate estimation of f (r, p). Since the parameter r
is typically pre-configured by the defense 2 , estimating p
becomes the main challenge. There are two factors that make
this task non-trivial. First, the loss levels seen by distinct flows
may be different. Fortunately, this should be less of an issue
for a RED queue, since RED drops packets randomly, and thus
helps evenly distribute loss events across flows. Consequently,
the loss event rate experienced by a single flow can be inferred
from the overall link loss rate observed at the local router [10].
The second issue regarding estimating p is the selection of an
accurate observation duration T L . As the overall link loss rate
oscillates at small time scales, e.g., several round-trip times,
we expect that T L should be reasonably large in order to
filter out rate fluctuations. We found that when the link load
is stationary, as long as T L is larger than a few hundreds
r, the accuracy of the estimation is quite insensitive to the
specific value of T L . Therefore, we set the default r to 40ms
and use a fixed T L of 20 seconds in the rest of the paper. In
practice, such a value would also be small enough to quickly
detect variations in the steady state loss level, as the congestion
level of most Internet paths usually stays unchanged for several
minutes [28].
2) Estimating Resource Usage of Flows: The detection
component also needs to be aware of the rate of incoming
flows so as to detect malicious traffic. Estimating the rate of
a flow is equivalent to estimating its traffic volume within a
certain time period. Fig. 2 depicts an architecture for realizing
this task. Specifically, the system time is divided into a series
of consecutive measurement intervals with equal length of T k
seconds. Without loss of generality, the current measurement
interval is indexed with 0, and the previous with 1 and so on.
Each interval keeps its own set of counters for recording the
volume of transit flows. Let n ik denote the value of the counter
assigned to flow i in the kth measurement interval. Then,
the expected volume of traffic flow i sends in T k seconds,
denoted as n̂i , can be estimated using a moving average (MA)
2 We explore the impact of a pre-configured r on TCP flows with different
round-trip times in Section IV-B.

The total time span over which n̂ i is estimated, i.e., hTk ,
is denoted as the time horizon T H . Irrespective of how n ik
is calculated, TH has a significant impact on how well the
detection component can differentiate legitimate TCP flows
from non-conformant flows. As with the link loss rate, the rate
of TCP flows also exhibits natural fluctuations at small time
scales (See Fig.3(b) in [24] for a demonstration). Hence, the
detector may wrongly estimate the traffic volume of flows if
that volume is measured over a relatively short horizon. Using
a very long horizon alleviates this problem, but raises the
risk of ignoring flows that significantly violate TCP behavior
at short time scales. Therefore, it is crucial to select the
“right” time horizon(s) to efficiently trade off transparency
and accuracy.
We discuss next options for measuring traffic. A straightforward approach is to update n ik upon each packet arrival.
Obviously, this is not a scalable solution. We argue that a
defense system should rely on sampling techniques to reduce
the number of packets or flows that needs to be remembered. In
this paper, we focus on a simple random sampling technique 4 .
Random sampling selects every incoming packet with a certain
probability s. As shown in Fig. 2, all counters are initialized to
zero at the beginning of a measurement interval. A new sample
of flow i in the current interval increases the counter n i0 by 1,
and also triggers the update of n̂ i . By comparing n̂ i with n̂T ,
the maximum average number of samples a TCP-friendly flow
would generate in the same period, one can decide whether a
flow violates the standard TCP behavior. A flow is identified
as TCP-unfriendly if n̂i > n̂T = f (r, p)Tk s 5 .
B. Regulation Strategy
The role of the regulation component, is to filter malicious
traffic and turn it into conformant traffic. Next, we introduce
several regulation strategies that differ in both their reaction
speed and their regulation intensity.
1) Progressive Dropping With Delayed Response: The first
regulation mechanism we introduce tracks the amount of outof-profile traffic generated by a non-conformant flow and drops
its packets accordingly. In particular, upon the completion of
every measurement interval, the regulator retrieves the latest
3 Other moving average schemes with unequal weights, e.g., the exponential
weighted moving average (EWMA) algorithm, can also be used. We found
that the choice of a specific averaging scheme has minor impact on the
performance differences across distinct defenses.
4 There have been a number of recent works [6], [16], [12] that address
the issue of how to apply advanced sampling schemes to measure traffic
efficiently. Though these schemes can increase the accuracy of traffic measurement in particular instances, we expect the impact of a specific sampling
technique to be smaller than that of the horizon setting. As we shall see, an
effective defense scheme can be built upon a random sampling technique as
long as it operates with an appropriate horizon(s).
5 To account for variable size packets, ni , n̂i and n̂T can all be byte counts.
0

measurement results n i0 and n̂T from the detector, and assigns
to flow i a dropping probability p i equal to:

+
n̂T
1− i
(3)
n̂
throughout the next interval. It is easy to see that when the
system is stable (f (r, p) is a constant), and there are no
sampling errors, Eq. (3) computed at the end of a measurement
interval is exactly equal to the fraction of excess traffic flow i
generates in the most recent horizon. Thus, by probabilistically
dropping packets accordingly, the regulator attempts to filter
out all excess traffic of a non-conformant flow and bring its
rate back to f (r, p).
We name the above regulation policy the “Progressive
Dropping with Delayed Response” (PD-DR) strategy, as it progressively tracks down how much a flow violates the standard
TCP behavior. For a “new” non-conformant flow appearing
in the system, the PD-DR strategy exhibits a natural delay
in applying its penalty, as obtaining an accurate estimation
of the amount of excess traffic can only be achieved after
that flow has been monitored for an entire horizon. Thus,
we suspect when TH is relatively large, this type of defense
may not effectively regulate malicious flows with a highly
variable rate process. For instance, it is possible that when the
regulator finally comes up with a correct dropping decision, the
attacking flow has already disappeared, making the regulator’s
efforts futile.
2) Cut-Tail Dropping With Instant Response: The second
strategy we consider attempts to overcome the intrinsic limitations of the PD-DR scheme, by reacting to suspicious traffic
at the earliest possible time. To achieve a fast response, this
strategy only monitors traffic seen in the current measurement
interval, i.e., using a history length h equal to 1. 6 . Moreover,
instead of waiting until the end of a measurement interval,
this regulation mechanism starts penalizing a flow immediately
after it has been classified as malicious. Specifically, for any
given flow i, the regulator compares n i0 with nT upon every
update, and if n i0 > nT , all subsequent packets from flow i are
dropped for the rest of the interval. This process repeats anew
in each measurement interval. In an ideal situation without
sampling errors, this mechanism can also correctly filter out
all excess traffic.
We name this regulation scheme the “Cut-tail Dropping with
Instant Response” (CT-IR) strategy. Clearly, in order for a CTIR regulator to respond quickly to sudden traffic violations,
a small measurement interval length must be used. However,
because of intrinsic TCP rate fluctuations, this is also likely
to trigger frequent false detections and penalizations, which is
detrimental to achieving a high degree of transparency.
3) CT-IR with Slack: To reduce the potential damage a
CT-IR regulator could impose on regular TCP flows, we
extend the basic CT-IR scheme by introducing a slack factor
6 Such a regulation mechanism may also be configured with h > 1.
However, this will slow down the reaction speed and can be shown to reduce
the regulation scheme’s efficacy against bursty attackers. We therefore do not
consider such cases.

δ (δ ≥ 1). A regulator that employs both the CT-IR scheme
and the slack only applies cut-tail dropping on a flow i
when ni0 exceeds an inflated TCP-friendly profile of δ · n T .
This enables the regulation component to focus on flows that
significantly violate the standard TCP profile, and therefore
makes it possible for a regulator to achieve both transparency
and fast response even when a very small horizon length is
used. On the other hand, as this scheme relies on a looser
definition of “normal traffic”, it alone would not be able to
enforce strict TCP-friendliness.
We have thus far reviewed several possible design choices
for flow level defenses. Specifically, defenses detect malicious
traffic by measuring the resource consumption of flows and
comparing it with the maximally allowable TCP-friendly rate
estimated at the local link. Once identified, a flow can be
regulated according to either one of three strategies, namely,
PD-DR, CT-IR, or CT-IR with slack.
III. E VALUATION OF D ESIGN C HOICES
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the aforementioned defense schemes through a number of case studies.
Our evaluation is qualitative in nature, as our focus is on
comparing the relative performance of these schemes and
exploring the impact of various design parameters, so as to
understand how to build a successful system. For both the
PD-DR and the CT-IR schemes, we let T H = TK (h = 1),
and mainly explore the influence of the horizon length T H . 7 .
As for the CT-IR with slack, we configure its horizon length
to r = 40ms, i.e., one round-trip time of a standard TCP flow,
and investigate how its performance changes with the slack
δ. For this initial investigation, all schemes use a sampling
probability of s = 0.1.
We carry out our investigation using the topology of Fig. 3,
which consists of one bottleneck link with a capacity of
C Mb/sec. The RED queue on the link has configurable
parameters minth , maxth and qweight , and has a maximal
size of B packets. The link is shared by N T long-lived TCP
flows (with no window size limitations) and N A malicious
flows, and we test the efficacy of the defenses in throttling
attacking traffic on that link. The access links of all TCP users
are assumed to also have a speed of C Mb/sec and a delay of
yms. We assume that each attacking source is connected over
a high-speed access link of, say 622 Mb/sec, and with a 5ms
delay. Parameters such as N A , NT , C y, as well as minth
and maxth can all be varied. Unless stated explicitly, we use
the following default setting: N A = 1 (a single attacker),
NT = 16, y = 10ms (40ms round-trip propagation delay),
C = 45Mb/sec, and consider TCP Reno users sending 500
byte packets. In addition, the default configuration of the RED
queue assumes B = 1000 packets, min th = 100 packets,
maxth = 300 packets and qweight = 0.002. The effect of
changing min th and maxth will be discussed later.
7 Though the PD-DR scheme can be configured with h > 1, the specific
value of h was found to have a minor impact for a given TH .
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A. Scenario 1: Transparency
The first scenario we study, is a configuration similar to
the default setting but with no attacker (N A = 0). In this
configuration, we are mainly concerned with whether the
defense system can stay transparent and allow TCP traffic to
consume the full link capacity. Fig. 4(a) reports, for both the
PD-DR and the CT-IR schemes, the ratio of the average TCP
throughput after and before the defense is turned on. A first
observation from the figure is that the horizon length T H has
a dominant impact on the level of transparency of a defense.
In contrast, the choice of the specific scheme has little effect.
In particular, when the horizon length is small, e.g., T H = 1r,
activating either defense causes TCP flows to lose over 15%
of their original throughput, while this amount diminishes to
less than 1% when TH exceeds 100r. Overall speaking, both
schemes perform similarly for a given T H .
The poor transparency seen at small horizons is in part
due to intrinsic TCP rate fluctuations. As discussed in Section II-A.2, TCP traffic oscillates substantially over small time
horizons, which makes measurements collected over these
intervals less representative of the real long term rate of a
TCP flow. Another contributing factor is the use of random
sampling. Specifically, a flow with a stable long-term rate
is expected to send fewer packets in a shorter measurement
interval. According to the central limit theorem, the number
of samples collected over such a period is, therefore, expected
to have a larger variance. When combining these two effects,
it is not difficult to see that a smaller horizon results in a
higher degree of rate estimation errors. This in turn translates
into more aggressive filtering, which prevents TCP flows from
fully saturating the link.
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Fig. 4(b) plots the throughput ratio of TCP flows as a
function of the slack factor δ, for the extended CT-IR strategy.
As shown in the figure, a large δ, e.g., δ > 2 helps TCP flows
retain most of their initial throughput. This is because a larger
δ corresponds to a looser rate constraint, and thus reduces the
probability of false classification. In short, Fig. 4(b) validates
the use of a loose traffic profile as another means for improving
transparency.
B. Scenario 2: One Persistent Attacker
We now evaluate the performance of the defense when
adding a single attacker. We first test a constant bit rate
(CBR) attacking source flooding at 1.5C. This type of attacker
captures the brute-force behavior of many typical attacks.
Fig. 5(a) compares the PD-DR scheme and the CT-IR scheme.
As one can observe, the two curves quickly diverge as T H
increases. The PD-DR scheme causes an initial TCP throughput drop of more than 30% when T H = 1r. This relatively
large drop is again mainly due to improper classification and
therefore penalization of TCP flows. The residual attacking
traffic surviving the defense also has an impact, but this impact
is minor as more than 90% of the flooding traffic was dropped.
When TH ≥ 140r, the impact of mis-classification becomes
negligible and the defense succeeds in keeping throughput
reduction below 10%. The CT-IR defense, in contrast, shows
a very different behavior. Even if it starts at a similar level of
throughput reduction, this value actually increases with T H .
We verified that this was not because the defense could not
identify the attacker and filter its traffic. The actual cause is
that CT-IR does not continuously penalize identified flows, but
allows a chunk of traffic to enter the queue before activating
the cut-tail dropping. As this amount is roughly equal to

f (r, p)TH (proportional to T H ), a longer horizon allows an
attacker to dump a larger burst within every measurement
interval. Since this burst arrives with a high rate of 1.5C, it
triggers heavy losses and greatly degrades TCP performance.
Fig. 5(b) further evaluates a slack CT-IR defense. As we
can observe, increasing δ initially helps improve TCP performance, since using a δ somewhat larger than 1 improves
transparency without greatly weakening the defense’s ability
to filter out-of-profile traffic. However, this trends reverses
when δ > 3, as the release of more attacking traffic induces
more disruptions than what can be compensated for by the
lower undue penalization on TCP. This explains the “hump”
in the figure, which prevents TCP flows from attaining more
than 75% of their original throughput. As a result, the overall
performance of a slack CT-IR defense remains worse than that
of a PD-DR defense.
C. Scenario 3: One Transient Attacker
In this sub-section, we consider a highly transient ON-OFF
attacker that floods at 1.5C for 40msec, and then stays idle
for 960msec before turning active again. As the attacker’s 1second attack cycle synchronizes with the TCP retransmission
timeout duration, it can frequently force TCP flows into
timeout. In [17], it was shown that this type of attacker can
almost shut off TCP flows without being detected by REDPD. We therefore, intend to test if one of the three defense
strategies can be used to throttle this type of attacker.
From Fig. 6(a), we see that neither the CT-IR scheme nor
the PD-DR scheme is efficient in thwarting the attacker. By
checking trace data, we found that the CT-IR defense did filter
out most of the attacking traffic when T H is small, e.g., TH =
1r, primarily because of its fast response speed. However, this
was negated by its poor transparency, which when combined
with the remaining attacking traffic, caused TCP flows to lose
more than 40% of their initial throughput. Compared with the
CT-IR scheme, the PD-DR defense responds even slower for
a given TH , yet exhibits similar transparency issues. Hence, it
results in even worse TCP performance. When T H becomes
large, both schemes perform poorly in regulating the attacker.
This is because the long-term rate of the attacker is merely
0.06C, a value similar to that of a standard TCP flow in steady
state. Consequently, most of the attacking traffic manages to
evade the defense and significantly reduce TCP throughput.
Fig. 6(b) identifies the slack CT-IR mechanism running at
TH = 1r as the best defense scheme among the three when
dealing with bursty ON-OFF attackers. In particular, its short
horizon length enables the defense to rapidly react to transient
traffic surges, while the inflated traffic profile significantly
reduces the possibility of wrongly penalizing legitimate TCP
users. As a result, the defense is able to drop most of the
attacking traffic without degrading TCP performance. Fig. 6(b)
also shows there exists a broad range of values for δ that yield
a relatively small throughput reduction. For instance, TCP
throughput decrease can be kept within 25% for δ between
1.5 and 5.5. As we will see later, such insensitivity facilitates
the selection of a default δ.

D. Towards a Double Horizon Design
Our investigation so far has revealed that no single defense
scheme is capable of being both efficient against all attacks we
consider and transparent to legitimate TCP users. Specifically,
achieving transparency usually calls for a defense that either
maintains a relatively long horizon (the PD-DR or the CTIR scheme), or that relies on a slackened traffic profile (the
slack CT-IR scheme). However, using a long horizon limits
visibility at short time scales, and as a result both the PD-DR
and the CT-IR schemes are unable to detect low-rate attackers
that significantly violate TCP behavior over short time periods.
The slack CT-IR scheme fares better in this respect, but its use
of a slack factor allows out-of-profile traffic to pass through the
regulator. This translates into poor performance when dealing
with persistent high-rate attackers. Efficiently throttling this
type of attacker calls for a long horizon mechanism that
continuously filters traffic, such as the PD-DR mechanism.
Because both the PD-DR scheme and the slack CT-IR
scheme achieve transparency and efficiency for different types
of attacks, it seems appealing to combine them to leverage
their complementary strengths. In the next section, we present
the design of such a hybrid architecture.
IV. A D OUBLE H ORIZON D EFENSE D ESIGN
In this section, we review the architecture design and
configuration of our double horizon defense. Due to space
constraint, we only highlight the main ideas. Full details can
be found in an extended technical report [24].
A. Overview of Architecture Design
Our double horizon design includes two different mechanisms: the slack CT-IR scheme and the PD-DR scheme. The
goal of the slack CT-IR scheme is to throttle short term traffic
spikes. Hence, we configure its horizon length to 1r to ensure
a fast response speed. In contrast, the PD-DR scheme should
rely on a relatively long horizon to enforce strict long-term
TCP behavior. In our design, we assume T K = kr so that it
has a total horizon length of hk round-trips. In the rest of the
paper, we denote these two mechanisms as the “short horizon
mechanism” and the “long horizon mechanism” respectively.
Both the short horizon and the long horizon mechanisms
calibrate their baseline behavior using the estimated loss rate
p provided by the router queue. In all other respects, the two
mechanisms operate independently, as they rely on separate
sampling processes and generate their own dropping decisions.
Both mechanisms track active flows using a standard hash
table data structure, in which each flow is represented by
a specific flow entry. Fig. 7 shows sample formats for the
short horizon flow entry (top) and the long horizon flow entry
(bottom). Specifically, a flow is characterized by a flow ID
field (FID), which is a hash value computed over the source
and destination addresses of its packets. The short horizon flow
entry uses one counter to record n i0 , while the long horizon
flow entry contains (h + 1) counters, one for recording n̂ i ,
and the others reserved for the h most recent measurement
intervals. For a newly arrived packet, the system checks both

FID

rnd

4
FID

rnd

4

2

Fig. 7.

h

2

Long Horizon
sl
h
k
0.01
2
250

ni0

k

B(h,k)

2

k

ni

0

1

h−1

B(h,k)

3

2

2

2

h

Fig. 8.

Flow Entry Format: Short Horizon and Long Horizon

hash tables, using the packet’s FID, to determine whether it
should be dropped by either of them. A packet passes the
defense if and only if it survives both mechanisms.
The 3-tuple <rnd,h,k> in each flow entry records the
most recent horizon, measurement interval and round-trip in
which a packet of that flow was seen. Based on such information, we proposed in [24] a simple strategy to clear obsolete
counters and flow entries that do not contain information in the
current time horizon. The strategy acts only upon new packet
arrivals, thus avoids synchronized operations at the end of each
measurement interval.
1) Overall Complexity: We have implemented the proposed
design into the NS-2 simulator [1]. As with hash tables, our
design has an O(1) packet processing complexity. Specifically,
every packet arrival incurs at most 1 read operation, for
retrieving corresponding flow entries 8 , and at most 1 write
operation, for updating specific counters or purging the entire
flow entry.
The main overhead of our design lies in the amount of
memory needed for holding flow entries. Specifically, we
dimension the hash table based on the maximal number of
valid flows it would accommodate at 100% link utilization.
Since the number of distinct flows reaches its maximum when
every sample maps to a different flow, the maximal number of
flow entries needed for the short horizon and the long horizon
hash tables are Css r/P and Csl (h + 1)kr/P respectively,
where ss and sl are their sampling rates, and P is the average
packet size. We specify the resource usage of both types of
flow entries in Fig. 7. Specifically, we assign 4 bytes to the FID
field, which is enough to represent 4 billion different flows.
Each counter is assigned 2 bytes, except for the counter used
for n̂i , which is allocated 3 bytes. We use 2 bytes to store
the rnd field. For the h and the k fields, using a total of
b(h, k) = log2 hk + 1 bits, so that B(h, k) = b(h, k)/8
bytes is sufficient. The total storage requirement of the two
hash tables in bytes, can therefore be obtained by multiplying
the maximum expected number of flow entries together with
the amount of memory each entry occupies, that is:
M (h, k, ss , sl )

= (9 + B(h, k) + 2h)Csl (h + 1)kr/P
+(8 + B(h, k))Css r/P

(4)

B. Parameter Selection and Validation
We now summarize how we select the default parameters.
Our main goal is to ensure adequate transparency for regular
TCP flows, while keeping memory requirements affordable.
We contend that ensuring transparency calls for a rate of loss
8 We

assume a CAM-based implementation of the hash tables as in [20].
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events caused by the defense, denoted as p f , to be small
compared with p, the stable loss event rate when there is
no defense. In [24], we estimated p f based on a simplified
stationary model ([3], [7]), which assumes a TCP window

size uniformly distributed within:  32 f (r, p)r,  43 f (r, p)r .
Our analysis showed that increasing the sampling rates s s
and sl , using a larger slack δ, and selecting a longer horizon
length hk all help to reduce p f . This is consistent with the
qualitative results observed in Section III-A. However, based
on Eq.(4), choosing larger values of s s , sl and hk is at a cost
of consuming more memory. A key finding in [24] is that
selecting a very large s l , e.g., sl > 0.1 is of limited benefit in
terms of memory usage, as the higher sampling rate translates
into only a modest reduction in the minimal horizon length hk
needed to achieve a given p f . This is again due to intrinsic
TCP rate fluctuations, which can only be averaged out by using
a sufficiently long horizon, e.g., over a hundred r. Hence, we
select sl = 0.01 and hk = 500, which is further split into
the optimal combination of h = 2 and k = 250. As for the
short horizon mechanism, we select a large sampling rate of
ss = 0.5, which allows us to use a relatively small δ, i.e.,
δ = 3.0, to achieve sufficient transparency. Using a large s s
only has a minor effect on the overall memory cost, as the
major consumption comes from the long horizon hash table.
We summarize the default parameter setting in Fig. 8.
1) Validation of Memory Consumption: Based on Eq.(4),
Fig. 8, and assuming an average packet size P of 500 bytes,
our default defense design needs (0.001175C) bytes to store
flow information. This is a value much smaller than today’s
router buffer setting. According to [5], [3], most existing
router designs use (RT T C/8) bytes buffer, where RT T is the
estimated round-trip time of a flow and is usually assumed to
be 250ms. This results in a buffer size of (0.03125C) bytes.
Our design only requires less than 4% of this amount 9 . For
instance, our design requires less than 12MB of storage for an
OC-192 (10Gbps) link,.
2) Validation of Transparency: We evaluated the impact of
the default defense on TCP flows in various settings. Results
are reported in what follows as well as in [24]. We first
consider the default topology, and vary N T , the number of
standard TCP flows, from 4 to 320. This yields a link loss rate
p ranging from 0.01% to 5%. Fig. 9(a) plots the resulting TCP
throughput ratio as a function of p. The figure shows that TCP
throughput reduction is less than 5% in all scenarios, and is
less than 1% when NT > 8. The throughput loss is higher for
smaller values of N T because in these cases, the chance that
multiple TCP flows are simultaneously penalized is higher.
9 To achieve efficiency at ultra-high link speeds, e.g., 160Gb/sec or beyond,
[3] advocates using a buffer size that is as small as 1 − 2% of what is adopted
in current router desi gns. Investigating how to make our design efficient for
such high speeds is left for future work.

Real Internet traffic exhibits a wide range of round-trip
latencies [9]. We consider next a scenario where TCP flows
with heterogeneous round-trip propagation delays are multiplexed. Specifically, we consider aggregating 46 TCP flows,
which are divided into 23 groups with their round-trip delays
evenly distributed between 20ms and 460ms. Fig. 9(b) shows
for each group, the throughput before and after turning on
the defense. It is easy to observe that the defense heavily
penalized flows that were more aggressive than standard TCP
flows, e.g., (group 1) TCP flows with a 20ms round-trip delay.
Nevertheless, the link bandwidth released by those flows was
mostly absorbed by other groups of less aggressive TCP flows.
Consequently, the overall TCP throughput drop is only a minor
amount of 1.2%. In [24], we further studied the effect of
varying the target round-trip time r. The results indicate that
increasing r tends to distribute link capacity more evenly
among flows, i.e., towards the max-min fair allocation, but
also results in larger throughput reductions as a wider range
of flows are regulated. From the perspective of sustaining high
throughput, the current choice of r appears to be reasonable.
We have also tested the default parameter choice in two
other configurations, one involving the aggregation of weblike traffic, and the other involving a topology with multiple
bottlenecks. In [24], we showed that in both scenarios, this
default configuration results in only very limited throughput
reduction for TCP flows.
V. E FFICACY OF THE D OUBLE H ORIZON D ESIGN
This section is devoted to the evaluation of the defense
capabilities of the proposed double horizon design, as well as
comparing its efficiency to that of another well-known flow
level defense, namely, the RED-PD system. In contrast to
Section III, the evaluation in this section is quantitative in
nature. In particular, our goal is to measure the extent to which
the defense system can regulate attacking traffic, based on the
notion of “impact factor”.
A. Performance Metrics
The “impact factor” is a measure that captures the average
impact of a single attacking flow, in terms of the equivalent
number of regular TCP flows that would have the same
effect. Specifically, assuming that launching N A attackers on
a link with NT standard TCP flows yields a TCP throughput
ratio of T Hr , i.e., the total TCP throughput is reduced by
100(1 − T Hr )%. If further assuming that standard TCP
flows share link capacity in an equal manner, this level of
performance degradation can also be achieved by adding

NT = NT (1/T Hr −1) standard TCP flows. The impact factor

F , is thus defined as the ratio of N T over NA :


NT
1
F=
−1
(5)
N A T Hr
Our implicit notion of an ideal defense system is that it should
limit the impact of any attacking flow to no more than that
of a normal TCP flow. This translates into a requirement for
a defense to achieve F ≤ 1. When this is not feasible, the
closer F is to 1, the better the defense.

B. Defense Efficacy: Single Attacking Flow
In the following, we explore the efficacy of the double
horizon design based on the impact factor it achieves. As
a benchmark, we start with the default configuration of
Section III where there is only a single attacking flow. For
comparison purposes, we also measure the impact factor of
the RED-PD defense.
1) Attacking Schemes: We characterize the traffic pattern
of a single attacking source using a generic ON-OFF model.
An ON-OFF source can be represented by the three-tuple:
< R, b, I >, where b and I are the lengths of its active (ON)
and idle (OFF) periods, and R specifies the rate at which the
source sends traffic when active. Despite its simplicity, this
ON-OFF model captures a broad range of traffic patterns. In
our experiments, we tested two specific situations. Our first
scenario assumes a basic CBR attacker (I = 0) and varies
its rate R from 0.05C to 1.5C. In the second scenario, we
fix R to 1.5C and set (b + I) to 1 second, while increasing
b from 10ms to 1000ms. This gives us a family of ON-OFF
sources that exhibit different levels of burstiness in their traffic.
Particularly, when b is small, these sources are essentially
the bursty “Shrew” attackers we tested before. At the other
extreme, when b = 1000ms the source always stays “ON”
and becomes a CBR attacker 10 .
2) CBR Attacker: Fig. 10(a) reports the impact factor of a
CBR attacker with a variable flooding rate, for both the double
horizon defense and the RED-PD defense. The figure shows
that the impact factor peaks at 1.3 for R = 0.15C and is
smaller than 1 after that, which shows that the defense was
reasonably successful in limiting the impact of the attacker
to a level close to that of a regular TCP flow. This value
is still a bit larger than 1, because the standard TCP profile,
i.e., f (r, p), slightly overestimates the actual TCP sending rate
by not considering time-out events [7]. Another interesting
phenomenon is that when R becomes sufficiently large, e.g.,
larger than 0.3C, the impact of the attacker actually diminishes. This is because the attacking traffic then triggers both
the short and long horizon mechanisms, and is thus penalized
twice. As the amount of extra penalty increases with the degree
of violation, an attacker with a higher rate injects a smaller
amount of traffic into the queue. We believe this to be a
desirable property, as it discourages an attacker from using
high flooding rates. Fig. 10(a) also plots the impact factor of
the attacker under the RED-PD defense. As we can observe,
the RED-PD defense can also limit the impact of the attacker
below a certain level. However, the filtering of out-of-profile
traffic is not as effective as in our design, as F can reach a
value greater than 2. Also, this value stays roughly constant
as R increases. This is because RED-PD relies only on a long
horizon mechanism to filter traffic, and thus does not apply
extra penalty on attackers with higher rates.
3) ON-OFF Attacker: Results for an ON-OFF attacker
are reported in Fig. 10(b), via a log-log plot of the impact
10 There is another case where both R and b/I are fixed, but b varies. Given
the minor effect of varying b, we omit the results here.
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factor. The figure demonstrates that the RED-PD system
performs poorly when dealing with highly transient attackers. In particular, the impact factor is larger than 10 when
b ∈ [20msec, 100msec], and peaks at a value about 90. This
confirms earlier results in [17], [23]. As pointed out in [23],
the RED-PD design cannot effectively penalize bursty ONOFF attackers because of its slow response speed. In contrast,
the double horizon design reduces the impact of such attackers
to a level an order of magnitude smaller. Specifically, when b
is small, it is the short horizon mechanism that acts against
transient traffic violations. When b increases from 10msec, the
impact factor initially grows as more traffic is allowed to enter
the queue. However, when b exceeds 40msec, the attacker also
triggers the long-horizon defense and gets penalized by both
mechanisms, which causes F to quickly diminish to less than
1. The peak value of F in this case is about 2.5, which is
larger than that in the CBR case. This implies periodically
sending a large burst has a greater, albeit bounded, impact
than continuously loading the system.
C. Defense Efficacy: Multiple Attacking Flows
We now extend our study to cases where there are multiple
attacking flows involved in the attack. In practice, this can
happen in two different scenarios. First, an attacker can
commandeer multiple compromised hosts to launch distributed
DoS (DDoS) attacks, in which each host contributes one
specific attacking flow. In addition, a single attacking host
assuming multiple source addresses (legal or spoofed) can
also generate traffic corresponding to multiple flows. This is
because most flow-level defense systems, including our design
and the RED-PD system, classify packets into flows based on a
combination of source and destination addresses. An attacker
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flooding with multiple source addresses can thus fool those
systems into believing that the attacking traffic belongs to
distinct flows. In this sub-section, we consider both scenarios.
1) Attacking Schemes: We first consider the multi-host
scenarios. As observed in V-B, a single host can have an
impact factor larger than 1 in two cases, either by using a
CBR flow with a moderate rate of 0.15C, or by crafting ONOFF patterns with a small active period. We concentrate on
these two strategies, because of their potentially bigger impact.
Specifically, we assume that there are N A attacking hosts, all
using one of the following strategies:
i. Constant Bit Rate: In this case, each attacking host floods
with a constant bit rate of R = 0.15C.
ii. Unsynchronized ON-OFF: In this case, every host
creates bursty ON-OFF patterns with < R, b, I > equal to
< 1.5C, 40msec, 960msec >. Attacking hosts are assumed to
act independently and start with a random phase uniformly
distributed within the 1-second period. We name such a
scheme the “Unsynchronized ON-OFF” strategy.
We consider next an attacker that has access to N A different
addresses, and floods at a fixed rate of 1.5C whenever active.
In such a context, the attacker has the ability to coordinate
timing between active addresses, or flows. For instance, by
using one address for a certain period before switching to the
next address, the attacker can craft synchronized traffic patterns across distinct flows. In our study, two address switching
strategies are considered:
iii. Padded Cycle: The first strategy, the “padded cycle”
strategy, is shown in Fig. 11(a). In this scenario, each address
is used for b = 40msec before the next address is activated,
+
seconds
and there is a padded idle period of N1A − b

between successive addresses. This strategy generates a series
of staggered ON-OFF sources as it cycles through all N A
addresses in a period of max (1, bN A ) seconds. When NA <
1/b, the padded idle period ensures that the impact of every
address is evenly distributed across the attack cycle.
iv. Congregate Cycle: Instead of distributing the effect of
different addresses across the attack cycle, the second strategy,
i.e., the “congregate cycle” strategy attempts to aggregate their
impact in a short time period. As shown in Fig. 11(b), within a
cycling round the attacker floods with each address for b/N A
(b = 40msec) seconds consecutively. Upon the completion of
one round, the attacker stays idle for 960msec before blasting
again, which creates a 1-second attack cycle. The rationale of
this strategy, is to maximize the impact of every traffic burst.
In particular, recall that if one address is used continuously
for 40msec, most of the associated traffic will be filtered.
Hence, rather than distributing many such “weakened” bursts
over time, as is the case in the “padded cycle” strategy, this
strategy attempts to inject the entire burst into the defense by
using a smaller “ON” period for each address.
2) Results: Fig. 12 reports the resulting F for cases where
NA increases from 1 to 32. Fig. 12(a) focuses on the double
horizon defense, while Fig. 12(b) studies the RED-PD defense.
The main observation from Fig. 12(a) is that all four strategies
exhibit an F that decreases with N A . Moreover, when N A
becomes large, all curves settle at a level below 1. Among the
three flooding strategies creating ON-OFF traffic patterns, the
curve corresponding to the “Padded Cycle” strategy decays the
fastest, In contrast, the “Congregate Cycle” strategy exhibits
the slowest decay in F . This suggests that TCP traffic is more
susceptible to large bursts that are relatively far apart, than to
many small, evenly distributed bursts. An off-line examination
indicates that this is because a large burst can shut off a
significant fraction of TCP flows by forcing them into timeout, while small bursts only decrease (halve) the TCP window
size, which has a lesser effect. Nevertheless, when N A > 25,
even the “congregate” strategy ends up with an F smaller than
1. The “Unsynchronized ON-OFF” strategy has a behavior that
is in between that of the above two strategies. This is due to
the random activation of attacking flows, which results in the
ON periods of some sources being spread apart, while others
cluster together creating a congregate effect.
The results of Fig. 12(a) confirms the efficacy of the double
horizon design. Fig. 12(b) paints an opposite picture for
the RED-PD system. Specifically, as ON-OFF patterns are
not effectively regulated, attackers using the “Unsynchronized
ON-OFF” or the “Padded Cycle” strategies can achieve an
impact factor larger than 200. Only the “Congregate Cycle”
strategy yields an F that actually decreases with N A . This
is because most of the attacking traffic already bypasses the
defense when N A = 1. As the strategy does not introduce
“new” traffic, the average impact of each address diminishes
as NA gets larger.
3) Alternative Configurations: Apart from the default configuration, we also evaluated the efficacy of our defense system
in several other settings, e.g., multiplexing web-like traffic,

aggregating heterogeneous TCP flows, as well as changing link
queue configurations. We verified that in all these scenarios,
the default defense can successfully identify all four attacking
strategies, and limit their impact to a level similar to that
of TCP-friendly traffic. We refer to [24] (Section V.D) for
a complete presentation of results.
VI. R ELATED W ORKS
In this section, we briefly survey related network DoS
countermeasures, and compare them with the scheme proposed
in this paper in terms of both efficacy and applicability.
Earlier works such as traceback [22], [4] attempt to identify
the source(s) of attacking traffic in order to shut them off.
Traceback mechanisms allow a victim to reconstruct the incoming path of attacking traffic, based on information elicited
from intermediate routers. Traceback is, however, not effective
in rapidly stopping an ongoing attack, as collecting enough
information to identify the sources often takes a long time.
Router-based defenses explicitly tackle the issue of online throttling of DoS attacks. As previously mentioned,
router-based defenses can be categorized into aggregate level
defenses and flow level defenses. Aggregate level defenses
rely on coarse-grain descriptor, namely, “traffic aggregates”
to identify suspicious traffic. For example, during extreme
congestion, the ACC system [18] classifies high-bandwidth
aggregates sharing a common destination address (or address
clusters) as malicious. This, as demonstrated in [18], enables
the defense to detect and contain large-scale, brute-force DDoS
attacks in many typical scenarios. The main challenge faced by
aggregate level defenses, is the difficulty of defining suitable
aggregates and their expected overall behavior as well as
setting proper triggers for enacting traffic regulation. This
makes such defenses vulnerable to sophisticated attackers
relying on carefully crafted traffic patterns (bursts) [23]. In
contrast, as flow-level schemes monitor every user for conformance with a particular profile, e.g., TCP friendliness, they are
more effective against individual attackers. In particular, the
double horizon defense proposed in this paper can successfully
confine attackers so that their individual impact does not
exceed that of a regular TCP flow. On the other hand, a
large number of attackers, even if constrained to be TCPfriendly, can eventually overwhelm any flow level defense.
Our contention is not only that the two represent very different
types of attacks, but that it is possible to design a reasonably
effective overall defense by combining efficient flow-level
schemes, such as the one proposed in this paper, together
with aggregate level mechanisms. For example, upon detecting
that the double horizon defense alone fails to limit link
congestion to a certain level, extra scanning could be activated
to detect and regulate suspicious traffic aggregates that are
likely associated with large-scale DDoS attacks. Validating the
feasibility and efficacy of such a combination is part of the
work we are currently pursuing.
Kill-Bots [15] is a server side defense mechanism aimed
at thwarting CyberSlam, i.e., massive DDoS attacks targeting web server resources such as CPU, memory, disk and

database bandwidth. Kill-Bots applies reverse Turing test such
as CAPTCHA graphical tests [2] to distinguish zombie hosts
(bots) from human users. Since performing these tests usually
requires higher layer services such as HTTP, Kill-Bots cannot
be used directly by routers to protect network infrastructure
resources such as bandwidth or buffer.
SIFF [25] and TVA [26] are recent proposals that rely
on the notion of “capabilities” to thwart DoS attacks. These
proposals are designed based on a simple rationale, i.e., a
sender should first gain permissions from the receiver before it
can make any of its packets reach that receiver. Such permissions, represented by tokens, or capabilities, are special fields
embedded inside every packet sent out by participating hosts.
Routers supporting capabilities check incoming packets and
drop all packets with invalid capabilities. Therefore, during
an attack, all attacking traffic would be blocked unless the
attacker could cheat the victim and obtain sending permissions.
Existing capability-based solutions mostly focus on designing
host and router functionalities for securely distributing and
validating capabilities, but have not explicitly addressed how
to efficiently issue capabilities to distinguish legal traffic from
unwanted traffic. We expect that some of the understandings
gained in this paper might help resolve this problem. For
example, a profile-driven approach based on “TCP friendliness” could be used for issuing “fine-grained” capabilities [26]
and rejecting out-of-profile traffic. Also, a system architecture
similar to our defense, i.e., enforcing the standard profile at
different time horizons, might help attain a reasonable tradeoff
between transparency and efficiency. How to incorporate our
design into capability-based framework, however, is beyond
the scope of this paper.
VII. C ONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a novel double horizon router
defense for efficiently regulating a broad range of network
attacks. The design was shown to have a reasonably low
implementation cost while remaining transparent to normal
TCP users, and most importantly being able to thwart a broad
range of attacking strategies. In particular, the mechanism
was found to prevent any attacker from having an impact
much greater than that of a regular TCP flow. Obviously, by
mustering a very large number of attacking hosts/identities, it
is still possible to significantly disrupt service, but the impact
of individual attackers has now been significantly curtailed.
We are currently working on implementing the design in a
Linux router to test its performance in more realistic settings,
and are also investigating the feasibility of combining it with
other router-based mechanisms such as ACC-Pushback.
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